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Despite the drift toward emulating selected models of
"hard s cf.ence" inquiry, there persist witllin sociology some
practitioners who take as their model the tenets of what
mf.ght be called, "natural.Lsm , I' Distinctive features of
naturalism are explicated, illustrated and contrasted with
other assumptions about the appropriate character of inquiry.
A number of sociologists allege a correspondence between certain models
of inquiry in what are called the hard sciences and the enterprise of
sociology. Some sociologists even self-consciously seek to imitate the
perceived models of inquiry of other fields.
Thus one tradition in sociology can, without too much violence, be
symbolized by the white-coated laboratory worker who manipulates glass and
steel apparatus, perhaps utilizing a variety of electrical or even elec-
tronic devices. His quest is for a specially and expensively outfitted
room or set of rooms someplace where he can manufacture data. A newer
tradition may perhaps be symbolized by the data banks and computers, the
white shirt and tie of the computer specialist and the economic analyst
and adviser (to stretch the hard science model somewhat). (I assume that
the image of the scholar secluded in his book-lined and oak-paneled study
is dead and bears mention only as a matter of historical curiosity.)
Although such images are doubtless vulgar, we might suggest one further
image which characterizes yet another tradition in sociology, one that is
also sensitive to the models of hard science. This tradition is perhaps
most aptly symbolized by the binoculars, hiking boots and flannel shirt
of the geologist or biological naturalist.
This might be called the naturalist tradition in sociology, using the
term naturalist in much the same sense as it is employed in botany and
zoology whe~e it seems to refer to those who, in the tradition of Darwin
and the Voyage of t.lie Beagle, choose to develop accounts of what they
observe in natural settings.
The notion of naturalism is not confined to biology, of course, but
is found also in literary and philosophical traditions, particularly in the
literary productions of such authors as Balzac and Zola.
K.JoS. III, 2 45 Spring, 1967
The co~~on theme in all naturalism seems to be an insistence upon
concreteness and dense and detailed description: a disposition to
depict subject matter in its own terms.
Those who have come to share the naturalistic outlook, while
they may differ in many details, tend to begin with whatever
confronts the human observer in his complete daily living and
to endeavor to f r ar-e a satisfactory amount of it in its own
terms. l
NATURALISM IN SOCIOLOGY
~fuile ~he above characterizes naturalism at a very general level, the
specifically sociological variety may be said to include the following
distinctive features: (1) Emphasis upon wha t is called "close" observation
of (2) the phencmenological worlds and activities of actors from which
(3) an anaLys Ls is cvoLv.id along (4) qualitative lines.
An explication of each of the four features will, hopefully, provide
an understanding of sociological naturalism.
1. Nctur&lists tend to open and/or close their works with the concept
of "cLosencss " when speaking (often defensively) of their methods. The
term is never d~fined or discussed, but simply used as though it were well
understood. The fact that it keeps reappearing in these key places and is
considered so basic :.. s not to 'tv-arrant discussion suggests, h oweve r , that
the term might be nn important clue to the temper of the naturalists.
Thus, we find on page 1 of Dalton t s, 11en \.Jho l·lanage,
... the ~im is to get as close as possible to the world of
managers and to interp~et this world and its problems
from t he Lns Lde , as they are seen and felt at various points
and levcls. 2
Or in speaking of sociological studies of deviance, Howard Becker feels
o1~)li6ed to comment:
...we do not have enough studies in which the person doing
the re8ea~cll has ach.Levcd close contact with t hos e he
studies, so t hat; he can become aware of the complex and
manifold chazacte r of t he de vi.zmt activity ... '. If (the
resecrchcr) is to ge~ an acccrate and complete account of what
deviants ~o ... he must spend at least some time observing
them in t11eir natl.lr::tl 11abitat as they' go about t heLr ordf.nary
activities. 3
The leading contemporary sociological naturalist has perhaps been
most insistent ~nd cute (as is his wont) on the matter:
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••• any group of persons--prisoners, primitives, pilots,
or patients--develop a life of their own that becomes
meaningful, reasonable, and normal once you get close
to it, and that a good T.,~lay to learn about any of"-·--···-
these worlds is to submit oneself in the company of
the members to the daily round of petty contingencies
to whLch they are subject. 4
When seen up close, the individual bring(s) together in
various ways all the connections that lle has in life ...
Many who have analyzed role have stood across the street
from the source of their data oriented by William James'
abstract view of human action instead of t he .;lovingly
empirical view established by his younger brother. 5
Small group experimenters have certainly stood up close
to their data but have used a considerable amount of this
opportunity to adjust their equipment. 6
What in fact does close seem to mean? Closeness, among other things,
refers to distance--which comes in at least two varieties: physical and
social.
From what we can glean from the works of such people as those quoted
above, closeness seems to refer to the minimization of both kinds of
distance. Such persons seem to counsel standing close physically; that
is being, spatially, with. people.
They seem also to counsel standing close socially by developing the
kinds of relationships that give access to the actual and total activities
of people through the day; close in the sense of intimate or confidential.
An additional sense of close, refers to close attention; searching
or minute investigation; attention to the minutiae of daily activity, as
in the phrase, lIa close account," meaning a detailed account.
To be close in these senses implies for the naturalist an observa-
tional methodology much after t.he manne r of geologists, scholarly flower
and bird watchers or orangutan and gorilla followers.
It seems ~lso to be felt that the objects under analysis must be
scrutinized in their natural settings, for only here, it is believed,
is one really close. ~Ioreover, the achievement of true closeness is felt
to take a long period of time.
2. If this is, at least in part, what is meant by closeness, then
what more specifically is to be done once one gets "cLose"?
As is congruent with the perspective of naturalism as a more general
style of thought, primary emphasis is placed upon catalogi~g the now
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confronted reality in its own terms.
Naturalists who study other than human objects must perhaps have
some difficulty at this point because the "own terms" of what we call
rocks, plants and animals might be somewhat moot.
The sociological naturalist is in the happier position of studying
objects that persent to h Lm a set of terms. These "te rms " are literally
the words used by the participants; or, to put it more abstractly, the
concepts that the participants employ in order to structure their local
world.
The specialized vocabulary of the group becomes then, a major element
of the observational chronicle. (As for the field biologists, exhaustive
notes become indispensable.) Vocabulary lists may be drawn up--attempting,
as it were, to discern the folk-ideology of the local scene.
In some branches of current sociological naturalism, such activity is
dignified by the use of concepts like "rhe phenomenoLogy of actors " or even,
"the e thnomethodoLogy of actors".
We studied what was of interest to the people we were
investigating because we felt that in this way we would
uncover the basic dimensions of the school as a social
organization and of the students' progress through it as
a social-psYchological phenomenon. We made the assumption
that, on analysis, the major concerns of the people we
studied would reveal such basic dimensions and that we
could learn most by concentrating on these concerns. This
meant that we began our study by looking for and inquiring
about what concerned medical students and faculty and follow-
ing up the connections of these matters with each other and
with still other phenomena.
We studied phenomena that seemed to produce group tension
and conflict because it seemed to us that the study of tensions
was most likely to reveal basic elements of the relationships
in which the medical student was involved. If it is true
that conflict and tension arise when the expectations govern-
ing social.relationships are violated or frustrated, then it
is clear that study of such instances will reveal just what
those expectations are; and the discovery of such expectations
is an important part of the sociological analysis of any
organization. 7
It is the commitment to catalogin.g activity in this sense of "its
own terms" that ma..kes naturalists suspicious of machines such as the
Chapple Interaction Chronograph or Bales' Interaction Process Analysis.
Such devices have a built-in initial commitment to the terms of the
investigator. From the start they collect data in terms of categories
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used by sociologists in constructing some part of the world, rather than
in terms of the categories used lion location. II
The naturalists' insistence upon beginning with people on their own
terms raises, of course, a major meta-theoretical issue; that of the impor-
tance or role of the categories of action used by the participants in
structuring and guiding their own activity.
Hhen the naturalist gets to analysis, the participants' constructions
will be a major focus. He makes much of particular folk-concepts and their
role in action. He draws his theoretical stance from that time-ravaged
ph r ase r IIIf people de f Lne situations as real, they are real in tlleir
consequences. if
It is rhf,s commdtrnerrt that draws a fundamental line between the
naturalist and those who feel the sociologist must from the very beginning
impose his own set of sociological folk categories upon data and can safely
minimize the importance of the concepts used by those he studies.
The categorie3 of the participants refer, of course, to on-going
activities; the participants are continually coding the stream of one
another's actions; they are acting and designating action as instances of
concepts and propositions.
The naturalist is necessarily interested, then, in chronicling all manner
of actual events; meetings, partings, ceremonials, casual conversations, formal
deliberations, a~d the like. In the same manner that the zoological natural-
ists have followed baboons and gorillas and observed their rounds and their
gatherings, their fights and their fornications, the sociological naturalist
strives to maintain a running record of sheer behavior sequences and collective
enterprises.
3. Again ar1s1ng from a commitment to objects on their own terms, the
naturalist is very reluctant to begin l;vitll pre-formed hypotheses which are
fitted to a systematic data collection and proposition testing apparatus.
The model of the explicit set of propositions (or hypotheses), cleanly
operationalized and implemented by a specially designed organization, seems
to the naturalist to assume knowledge of exactly those things which for him
are problematic.
Such a model ~ssu~es that the terms and activities of the world under
study are we l.L known and documented; that the concepts significant for t he
participants arc ,.t".ready established; that the significant features of a
unit are ~veJ.l-delineatcd.
So it is that naturalists preface their works with passages such as:
In one sense, our study had no design. That is, we had no
well-worked out set of hypotheses to be tested, no data-gathering
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instruments p~rposely designed to secure information relevant
to these hypotheses, no set of analytic procedures specified
in advance 0 Insofar as the term "design" LmpLi.es these features
of elaborate prior planning, our study had none. 8
We did not assume that we knew what perspectives the doctor
would need in order to function effectively in practice, for we
believed that only a study of doctors in practice could furnish
that information and such studies were not available. We did
not, furthermore, assume that we knew what ideas and perspectives
a student acquired while in school. This meant that we concen-
trated on what students learned as well as on how they learned
it. Both of those assumptions committed us to working with an
open theoretical scheme in which variables were to be discovered
rather than with a sche~e in which variables decided on in advance
would be located and their consequences isolated and measured. 9
Another worker tells us that:
A general characteristic of fieldwork is its temporally developing
character. T11e f LeLdworker usually does not enter t he fteld wi rh
specific hypotheses and a predetermined research design. I O
And, again being cute, a leading naturalist relates:
I did not employ usual kinds of measurements and controls. I
assumed that the role and time required to gather statistical
evidence for a few statements would preclude my gathering data
on the tissue and fabric of patient life. 11
A study may even have evolved as a consequence of holding a given job:
In the present research no explicit hypotheses were set up in
advance, but, as indicated in the Introduction, occupational
involvements usually preceded questions and consciousness of
problems to be studied. 12
This is not to say that the naturalists begin without concepts; that
they are baconians and believe that the data will speak for themselves;
although, as noted, in a significant sense the data do speak from them-
selves.
They begin, rather, with a set of general guidelines of sensitivity 0
They begin, in other ~vords, with training in sociology that is brought to
bear and tried out on the situation at hand.
To be sure (the fieldworker) does have general problems in
mind, as well as a theoretical framework that directs him
to certain events in the field. The trained sociologist or
anthropologist is equipped to make discriminations rather
quickly between what may be theoretically important or
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unimportant. The initial phase of fieldwork is a period of
general observation: Specific problems and foci have not
yet been determined. The fieldworker is guided mainly by
sensitivities to data derived both from his professional
b ackground and from his general notions about the nature of
his research problem. As he surveys the field initially,
he is continually titesting"--either implicitly or explicitly--
the relevance of a large number of hypotheses, hunches, and
guesses. Many preconceptions fall by the wayside during this
initial period, as the observer struggles to ascertain the
meaning of events and to place them in some initial order. 13
-,r~
In what is perhaps the understatement of the decade in sociology,
Becker, et al.) relate t he gener aL framework 'tvith whdch they regarded their
materials:
\ve decided to work witll a theory based on tile concept of
symbolic interaction, the theory first enunciated by Charles
Horton Cooley, John Dewey, and George Herbert !·lean and since
used and expanded by many others. This theory stresses the
more conscious aspects of human behavior and relates them to the
individual's participation in group life. It assumes that human
behavior is to be understood as a process in which the person
shapes and controls his conduct by taking into account (through
the mechanism of "role-taking") the expectations of others with
whom he interacts. 14
Combinin~ received sociological tradition with the local situation,
naturalists work toward what they refer to as an emergent analysis.
They conceive of themselves as evolving a set of problems or kinds of
things that appear to be central to the matters under observation.
So Dalton reports:
Many questions and hunches originating in the experience
at Milo and Fruhling were cross-fertilized by concurrent contacts
at Attica and Rambe~u. Since no simultaneous systematic study
could be made of all, and as Milo was the most accessible, that
firm became the nucleus of inquiries and the continuing point of
major effort. However, general questions and interpretations
were increasingly influenced by study of the other firms,
especially the factories. Common processes and similar recurring
situations evoked interlocking questions which led to establish-
ment of the problem areas. I S
* * *
During the second phase of fieldwork, the investigator has
begun to make sense of the ~assive flow of events. Significant
classes of persons and events have begun to emerge, certain aspects.
of the field have become important, and genuine propositions have
been formulated. His initial general problems may have undergone
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considerable reV1S10n and are now coming into clear focus.
This second phase then is marked by greater attention to
particular aspects of the field and by an emerging set of
propositions. 16
Becker and his colleagues in Bovs in White even explicitly contrast their
original view with their final emergent vi~v.
If we take the idea of design in a larger and looser
sense, using it to identify those elements of order, system,
and consistency our procedures did exhibit, our study had a
design. We can say what this was by describing our original
view of our problem, our theoretical and methodological commit-
ments, and the way these affected our research and were
affected by it as we proceeded. We will, then, turn in the
next chapter to a description of the point of view we finally
adopted, from which this book is written, and the analytic
procedures we adopted to implement it. 17
4. This brings us to what is perhaps the crux of the sociological
naturalist's enterprise.
Having gotten close to some segment of social life on its own terms and
having begun without formulated hypotheses or apparatus for testing them, the
naturalist must, in the logic of the case, develop his analysis along primarily
qualitative lines if he is to remain on safe scientific ground.
lihile quantitative statements are of the sort that X varies in some way
with Y, and A is present under condition B, C, and D and absent when they are
absent, or if X then Y; qualitative statements are of the sort that X exists,
or X is found in forms A, B, and C. These two latter types of statements
represent the main analytic activities of the naturalists.
Among the more thorough rationalizations of the X exists activity is
Selznick's commentary on the logical status of the concept of The Organiza-
tional Weapon or combat party. He tells us in the preface to the Free Press
edition of that volume:
My aim was to search out certain central features of the
communist type of political party and to trace its character-
istic role in the political arena. I S
The basic intellectual task was to formulate a complex
hypothesis stating the essential features of a going concern,
a system, such that the most important distinctive attributes
of communist political ~ction would be accounted for. These
attributes included the remarkable (1) persistence of the
communist core membership despite great fluctuations and turn-
over, and (2) the persistence of strategies and tactics of power
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aggrandizement despite significant shifts in political "line".
T11e search was clearly for a "latent structure," an emergent
pattern of adherence and control, of self-perpetuating, inter-
locking commitment. TIle name "combat party" was devised to
designate this system of interdependent behaviors, relation-
ships and beliefs. 19
In a work of this kind, the major concern is to identify
the system, to state what the "nature of the beast is. The
task is to construct a conceptual model of a functioning
institutional system. But this is also an exercise in typology.
We view the structure we are studYing as an instance of a class
of objects whose gener aLrfeat.u res are to be explored. The class
may have only one member but it is the kind of thing we are
dealing with that interests us. We ask: what kind of a social
sys tern is the communis t party? '~e answe r by developing a model
of the "combat party," including its strategies. 20
The same emphasis on complex portraits or models runs through the
formulations of other naturalists.
If we were going to look on the medical school as a sacial
system, it seemed to us that a particular style of analysis was
required. We would not be interested in establishing relation-
ships between particular pairs of clusters of variables. Rather,
we would be interested in discovering the systematic relation-
ships between many kinds of phenomena and events considered
simultaneously. Our analysis would proceed by establishing
correlations but by building tentative models of that set of
systematic relationships and revising these models as new
phenomena requiring incorporation came to our attention. We
did not propose hypotheses and confirm or disprove them so much
as we made provisional generalizations about aspects of the school
and the students' experience in it and then revised these gen-
eralizations as "negative cases"--particularly instances in which
things were not as we had provisionally stated them to be--showed
us further differentiations and elaborations required in our
model. 2l
*
The outcome of such research is not one, two or a few
carefully tested hypo t hases but a set of many interrelated
propositions. For example; in our study, propositions about
how psychiatrists handle patients in a hospital setting are
related to propositions about the psychiatrists' professional
affiliations and careers, as well as to propositions about the
organization of the hospital's wards. Similarly, propositions
about the perspectives of nurses toward their work mesh with
propositions about their professional identities, the behavior
of psychLat r Lsts , the structural necessities of ward organiza-
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tion, and lines of hospital authority. Fieldwork is well
advanced when many apparently scattered observations are
related to one or more propositional sets and these sets
in turn are demonstrably and logically related to one
another. 22
The notion of proposition in these statements is misleading for it refers
to propositions of the X exists sort, as the actual analysis reveals and as
is sometimes said .
. . . t.he propositions vJith whLch t~.le f LeLdwozk was coucerned
were primarily qualitative. Amount or degree waD not so important
to our theoretical interests as occurrence and form. Again taking
negotiation as an example, we were interested that special arrange-
ments were made by certain classes of people about certain matters
and were terminated under given conditions. Our methods seemed
appropriate to those questions. On the other hand, had we been
interested in establishing the extent to which·the business of
handling patients is carried out through routine procedures versus
special arrangements, then other methods would have been appropriate.
To answer that question, of course, is certainly an important next
step--indeed essential to future general understanding of organiza-
tional functioning. 23
Although not logically different in any fundamental way, the second type
of activity, X comes in forms A, B, C, e t c , , leads to a k.Lnd of "type







Or Sykes, in his work on the curruption of authority in prisons, gets
mileage out of the ways in which corruption may occur: through friendship,
reciprocity and default. 25
The most extreme of the current sociological naturalists has made a
career not only out of X exists but out of building up substance from the
ways in which X exists. '
4 Types of precaution practices.
2 Parts of front.
2 Alternative parts of front.
6 Discrepancies between appearances and reality.
3 Groups of minor events which can disrupt a projected definition.
2 Functions which must be performed on a team.
3 Dimensions of variation of a position on a team.
2 Types of regions.
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2 Types of standards in the front region.
6 Forms of decorum (ends list with "etc. It).
3 Limitations on backstage informality.
3 Controls over access to the front region.
4 Ways of managing breakdown in audience segregation.
6 Types of team secrets.
11 Discrepant roles.
4 Types of communication incompatable with the fostered impression.
7 Ways of derogating the audience.
S Types of staging cues.
5 Subtypes of one type of team collusion.
4 Principle forms of performance disruptions.
4 Types of scenes.
3 Defensive attributes and practices to insure the show. 26
In distinct contrast to the tendency of naturalists to be quite silent
as to exactly how they arrive at their portrayals of X exists and X comes
in forms A, Band C, one must note the recent effort~ of Glaser and Strauss
to formalize ways in which all investigator can go about constructing an
"emergent" qualitative analysis. 27 A work such as their Discovery of Ground
Theory may serve, indeed, to remove a large portion of the IImysticU from
naturalism as an enterprise, rendering emergence a more understandable and
mundane, albeit difficult, process and on that account a less interesting one.
Considered in more conventional terms, the naturalists are engaged, with
a vengeance, in the first steps of theory building--the concocting of con-
ceptual frameworks. But it is the concoction of conceptual frameworks with
a difference: the concepts and any tentative propositions grow out of a
selfconscious immersion in, and effort to bring order to, a segment of social
life for the very purpose of such discovery.
This brings us to the question of the relation of systematic evidence to
this kind of enterprise.
Insofar as the naturalists move on to quantitative statements involving,
of necessity, large numbers of cases, each measured in a comparable way, they
stand on shaky ground. As a consequence, propounded links come to be stated
in a highly qualified manner, as, "it is possible that ..... ; Hit seems to be
the case ..... ; ualthough the data are not systematic, it appears that ••. ".
And of course, their works are replete with paragraphs of the following
sort:
That other methods could fruitfully have been employed to
follow through on the field methods we do not argue. Proceeding
from where our research leaves off, there are multitudinous
possibilities for quasi-experimental studies, objective surveys,
testing procedures--even for more controlled observations and
conversion of fieldwork results into statistical form. 28
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However j insofar as they concern themselves with building structures
of essential features or types of things, the question of evidence involves
a different set of canons than that more usually associated with scientific
proof. It involves rather a set of canons used typically in legal and
intelligence operations.
X may be said to have certain features that justify a certain character-
ization or a certain classification. In such a case the prime question seems
to be: what is the evidence that any such feature ever existed even once
any place in the world? The question is one of the accuracy of certain alleged
concrete space-time-bound purported facts.
As readers of the works of sociological naturalists, we face something
of the same problem as that faced by a judge, jury or intelligence agent 0
Are t he facts actually as asserted so that; t.hey can possibly warrant; a given
conceptual classification?
There is, of course, a reasonably codified set of rules in law and in
intelligence work for such assessments--essentially involving such matters
as internal and external consistency and observer reliability.
Beyond this, the works of sociological naturalists must be judged on
the kind of grounds used in assessing frameworks of a grander sort. We say,
that's all very beautiful, but what do we do with it? That is, we invoke
the criterion of fruitfullness. (There is, of course, the additional criterion
of logical coherence which may also be invoked.)
While these four features seem reasonably to characterize the work of
sociological naturalists at a conceptual and methodological level, there is
yet another feature of their work that bears mention; a feature that is related
to their enterprise in a somewhat different way. For lack of any better terms,
this feature might be viewed as a type of metaphysical bias or existential
orientation.
Although beginning with an insistence upon considering social life in
its own terms, their resultant analyses are constructions, built upon these
tenns, rather than merely depictions of them. In one sense then, the
naturalisi becomes a formalist, for he eventually steps outside the world
as it is viewed by the participants and projects an independent construction
that incorporates, rather than merely depicts, the perspectives and activi-
ties of the participants.
A conspicuo~s feature of this construction is a singular lack of
decorum, to bor r ow a work used by CouLdne r in th Ls connection. 29 To possess
de co rum is to be "charact e r Lzed by prop r i e ty "; lito observe the requirements
of polite society"; to be s eemIy , sedate, decent and proper.
Whatever the topic, naturalists seem able to contrive ways in which to
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violate the publicly polite conventions of decorous discourse.
When naturalists study a reputable and conventional institution, such
as a medical school or general hospital, the participants emerge as types
who are fully as fumbling and conniving as the sorts of people who are
publicly defined as disreputable. Medical students, for example, are seen
as responding to the pressures of medical school by moving from a perspective
of IITlle Best of All Professions" to "An Effort to Learn It All" rhrough "You
Can t t Learn It Al.L" and ending in iI~-Jhat Do They 1.Jant Us to Know?" That is,
"the fate of Ldeal.Lsm" is cllronicled. 30
In contrasting studies of the medical trade done by the formalistic
Harvard-Columbia axis and rhe naturalistic Chf.cago base, Goul.dn e r comments
more generally.
It is difficult to escape the feeling that the Harvard-
Columbia people are more respectful of the medical establish-
ment than rhe Chicagoans, that they more readily regard it in
terms of its own claims, and are more prone to view it as a
noble profession. ChLcagoans , however, tend to be uneasy
about t he very idea of a "profes s Lon" as a tool for study,
believing instead that the notion of an "occupat.Lon" provides
more basic guide-lines for study, and arguing that occupations
as diverse as the nun and the prostitutue, or the plumber and
the physician, reveal instructive sociological similarities.
Chicagoans seem more likely to take a secular view of medicine,
seeing it as an occupation much like any other and are somewhat
more inclined toward debunking forays into the seamier side of
medical practiceo Epitomizing this difference are the very
differences in the book titles that the two groups have chosen
for their medical studies. Harvard and Columbia h ave soberly
called two of their most important works, HThe Student-Physician",
and "Exper Imerrt Perilous It, while t he Chicagoans have irreverently
labelled their own recent study of medical students, the nBoys
in X-lhite. "31
So too, the naturalists contrive ironic puns for the titles of their
works , such as I·len Who l'1anage,32 Liquor License33 (a study of bars by an
autho r with the doubly ironic first name of Sherri), "Norma l, Crimes, :r34
"Peers and Queers ti35 (when that author is in h i.s naturalistic mood), and
a study of death entitled PassinR On. 36
These and ot.her studies violate decorum by focusing upon aspects of
various institutions and em?loying concepts that call attention to certain
areas of institutional life which the institutional guardians would prefer
not to have spoken of or written about publicly.37
And they violate decorum by conceiving the respectable in disrespectable
terms and vice-versa. tlental patients become inmates,38 medical practice
becomes a tinkering trade,39 psychoanalytic theory becomes psychiatric
ideology,40 junior colleges become coolers of educational marks. 41
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Thier scrutinization of publicly disrespectable institutions likewise
violates decorum by their tendency to conceptualize such institutions in
polite and respectable tenus and to report in detail the "prob Lems" (read
victimization) of the disreputable. Mental hospitalization becomes a
career;42 crime becomes norrnal;43 heroin users become victims of bigotry.44
It is tempting to dismiss SUcll violations of decorum with the explanation
that they result from the proclivities of the most disaffected survivors of
Ph.D. prograrns in sociology. That is, naturalists are simple "wrf.t.Lng out;"
their personal dispositions to debunking.
It is more interesting, however, to view this lack of decorum in terms
of the previously enumerated characteristics of the naturalistic stance.
Naturalists aim to, and presumably do, get close. They seek to chronicle
the words and deeds of people from this range.
This is the rub. TIley chrond cLe all the words and deeds to whLch they
are privy; the public and the private; the laudable and the reprehensible;
the prideful and the shameful. They pry into what goes on behind closed
doors, in secret places and into what is said in off moments and off the
record. TIley work , in short, witll the speakable and t he unspeakable.
I suggest t hat; ,anyone who sets out self-consciously and explicitly to
make a detailed ch ront.c Le of every t hLng that happens in some local part of
the world must, if he is at all successful, be forceably confronted with the
division between publicly fostered 'impressions and rlletoric and the facts of
the place. We are all aware of such a division; knowledge of it and adeptness
in managing it is part of what it means to be a socialized and normal inter-
actant.
But this is the special poignancy of the naturalistic stance. ~fuile we
only live this division, the naturalist must contemplate it, he must dwell
on it. Because of hLs commftmen t to taking t.hLngs on their own terms, tile
differences between public professions and understandings and private, feelings
and doings become a central feature of his materials.
As a result, the naturalist becomes, perhaps, too conscious of how
understandings of situations very; he becomes over Ly-iaware of the poor tffitl1
between official and unofficial versions of reality.' (Both versions, of course,
are equally valid in the sense t hat; what; is real is always a matter of where
one stands.) Jus t as our stereotype of t he reporter as cynical is in a mea-
sure true, so too, the cynacism expressed in the naturalist's violation of
public decorum is, in some degree, an accurate reflection of his structural
location. (Sociological naturalists, unlike reporters, tend not to have
conservative publishers and fearful rewrite men.)
In this light, also, we can perhaps partially understand why it is that
a document like Goffman's Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, could, perhaps
have been written only by a naturalist, since it is an extended exp Lf.catLon




I have sought in these notes to take a first step toward delineating
those characteristics of a number of contemporary sociological prac-
titioners whf.ch make it possible to reasonably construe them as a "se t ".
I have necessarily obscured the ways in which they are different in order
more firmly to determine the ways in which they are alike. So, too, I
have ignored a traditional label applied to many of them, that of
"s ymbolic interactionist ll • All symbolic interactionists are not naturalists
and all naturalists are not symb ol.Lc interactionists. 45 I have focused,
rather, on the logical and methodological structure of their procedure;
logical and methodological matters seeming; indeed, to be increasingly the
basis upon whf.ch "sociologies" are differentiated.
I have intentionally atternpted to be non-evaluative, albeit playfully
irreverent, in setting forth the elements of this tradition. It is better,
I suggest, carefully to perceive what is afoot before launching either an
attack or a defen~e. So too) much more thought must be directed to the
more general question of the nature and standing of all present sociologi-
cal theory and research before one can reasonably assess the variant here
described.
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